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Earnings Losses 
for Injured Workers 
Myth 12. Individual accounts would 
not affect labor supply and retirement 
age because they closely link 
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between 
contributions and the amount invested in 
an individual account. Also, individual 
accounts would not be financed by an 
explicit tax, which would distort labor 
supply. However, the volatility in stock 
and bond markets causes there to be 
a weak link between contributions 
and benefits. Further, a mandatory 
contribution, whatever its link to 
benefits, can be an implicit tax because 
it is mandatory. If the mandatory 
contributions act like an implicit tax, that 
would discourage workers from working 
and encourage them to retire. The low 
participation rates of workers in Latin 
American mandatory accounts may 
result from such an effect on their labor 
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in 
equity markets can cause workers with 
individual accounts to delay retirement, 
with that effect occurring at a time when 
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor 
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in 
Washington, D.C.
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Since publishing Adequacy of 
Earnings Replacement in Workers’ 
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt 
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have 
continued to analyze the important 
policy issues discussed in the report. The 
National Academy of Social Insurance 
(NASI) study panel that produced the 
report found that earnings replacement 
for permanent partial disabilities 
in five states ranged from 29 to 46 
percent—a rate far short of the 67 percent 
replacement rate specified by statute 
in these state workers’ compensation 
systems. Thus, the analysis raised 
concerns about the adequacy of workers’ 
compensation earnings replacement 
benefits.
However, there were some problems 
with these findings. First, employer 
representatives on the study panel 
objected to using the two-thirds 
earnings replacement standard for 
permanent partial disability (PPD) 
cases. They asserted that because 
such cases are frequently disputed 
and their compensation may be the 
result of compromise settlements, it 
is inappropriate to expect such claims 
to achieve the two-thirds standard. 
Therefore, the study panel believed 
it would be beneficial to assess the 
adequacy of temporary total disability 
benefits. 
In addition, there were analytical 
issues that affected the results, even 
though the same assumptions had been 
used for studying the five states. Because 
the analysis focused on aggregate wage 
losses and aggregate compensation 
payments, it implicitly weighted the 
more serious claims more heavily. The 
longer the wage loss continues, the more 
times the injured worker is counted in 
the aggregate wage losses. But is the 
policy question, what proportion of all 
the wages lost by injured workers is 
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all 
injured workers received adequate wage 
replacement? The earlier studies answer 
the first question, but not the second. 
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question, 
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the 
State of Oregon for administrative data 
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity 
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon’s 
workers’ compensation system. Our 
empirical work uses a dataset composed 
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured 
in 1992 or 1993. They all received 
temporary disability payments of at 
least three days, or PPD compensation. 
We exclude workers with disabilities 
lasting less than three days, and those 
with missing values for certain key 
variables. We also exclude workers aged 
51 and older at the time of injury in 
order to reduce the effect of voluntary 
early retirement on postinjury wage loss 
calculations. 
We have unemployment insurance 
data, which consist of quarterly wage 
records for all Oregon workers from the 
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth 
quarter of 1998. We were able to match 
98.8 percent of injured workers to their 
administrative wage records (based on a 
unique but anonymous identifier provided 
for each worker). The resulting dataset 
combines claims-related data such as date 
and type of injury, compensation benefits, 
length of absence from work, and 
demographic variables, with the pre- and 
The NASI study panel’s 
analysis raised concerns about 
the adequacy of workers’ 
compensation earnings 
replacement benefits.
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postinjury wage record for each injured 
worker. We include 5 preinjury quarters, 
the quarter of injury, and 20 postinjury 
quarters. 
The cumulative wage change is 
calculated by summing the differences 
between observed postinjury quarterly 
wages and the wage in the preinjury 
quarter for each injured worker. We 
include 20 postinjury quarters, although 
we do not observe earnings in all of 
them for many of the workers, due to the 
incidence of missing (unreported) wages. 
Finally, we compute the wage growth for 
uninjured workers using the same method 
and use it as a baseline against which 
to assess the earnings losses of injured 
workers. 
Earnings Losses
Using a 10 percent random sample 
of all unemployment insurance wage 
records in Oregon, and ignoring the 
observations with zero for wages (a 
mixture of those who really had no 
earnings and those whose earnings were 
not reported), we find that the typical 
Oregon worker’s cumulative earnings 
increased by $9,943 in 1993 dollars in the 
five years from 1993 to 1998. Average 
annual real earnings for uninjured 
Oregon workers increased from $18,306 
to $23,892, or 31 percent, during these 
years. So the average increase in real 
annual earnings for uninjured workers 
in Oregon during our observation period 
was $5,586, and the total increase over 
the period was almost $10,000. 
On average, the 7,480 Oregon workers 
who suffered a short-term total temporary 
disability injury (3–7 lost workdays) in 
1992 and 1993 had an earnings loss over 
five years of $1,123 when compared 
to the random sample of uninjured 
Oregon workers from the same period. 
Interestingly, only $212 of this earnings 
loss occurs in the actual quarter of injury. 
So there appears to be a persistent wage 
loss for even these relatively mild injuries 
in Oregon. 
For moderate injuries involving 
between 8 and 30 days of work lost, the 
average five-year wage loss compared 
to uninjured workers is $3,545. Serious 
injuries involving 31–60 days lost work 
(6–12 weeks) carry commensurately 
more serious wage losses of $6,422. 
Severe injuries involving more than 60 
lost workdays mean an average earnings 
loss of $10,359 compared to uninjured 
workers. 
Figure 1 shows these results. Starting 
from the preinjury quarterly earnings 
at time t = −1, the earnings of injured 
workers (except the 3–7 day group) 
decline in the quarter of injury (t = 0) 
and in the following quarter (t = 1). 
Then earnings begin to recover but never 
overtake the earnings of the uninjured 
workers, at least not within five years. It 
takes two quarters for earnings to recover 
to the preinjury level for those with 8–30 
days lost. It takes three quarters for those 
with paid disability durations of 31–60 
days, and 7 quarters for those losing 
more than 60 days (12 weeks) of work 
to a workers’ compensation claim. In 
fact, at the end of five years, those who 
were originally off work for more than 60 
days were still suffering earnings losses 
of nearly $500 per quarter compared to 
the earnings gains of uninjured workers. 
Permanent partial disability claimants 
recover their preinjury earnings by 6 
quarters following injury, but after 5 
years (20 quarters) they have similar 
continuing losses of just over $500 per 
quarter. 
Earnings Replacement
Wage losses continue long after one 
might have assumed the effects of the 
injury would have ended. In fact, Figure 
1 shows that wage losses associated 
with workers’ compensation claims may 
be permanent. Evidently the injury has 
produced an interruption in the income 
stream that is never fully recovered, even 
for injuries involving as little as 8 days 
off work. While wage growth returns 
to something like the same rate as for 
uninjured workers, the initial loss is never 
made up. So the question is, how is the 
workers’ compensation system dealing 
with these losses?
Table 1 shows the mean wage loss, 
mean compensation paid, and real 
earnings replacement rates for the paid 
disability duration classes used earlier. 
Again, we used the preinjury earnings 
for each individual and accumulated 
losses for five years following the injury, 
as compared to the earnings growth of 
uninjured Oregon workers. Under these 
assumptions, it appears that the actual 
Figure 1  Changes in Quarterly Wages Relative to Own Preinjury Wage, Injured 
Workers (age ≤ 50), and a Sample of Uninjured Workers
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Groups by paid 
duration of disability N
Aggregate real 
replacement rate 
(%)
Mean
 earnings loss 
(1993 $)
Mean 
compensation
(1993 $)
TTD 3–7 days 7,480 23.9 1,123 268
TTD 8–30 days 9,303 23.1 3,545 820
TTD 31–60 days 3,162 31.6 6,422 2,028
TTD > 60 days 2,468 68.7 10,359 7,117
PPD 12,655 152.6 8,764 13,373
Table 1  Estimated Losses, Compensation, and Replacement Rates,  
by Paid Disability Duration
wage-loss replacement rate increases 
with the duration of disability, with PPD 
claimants doing the best. Of course, it 
should be pointed out that, under the 
assumption that the PPD claimants have 
lifelong (or permanent) impairments, 
their earnings losses will continue far 
beyond the five-year mark.
This in turn will serve to lower the 
replacement rate since nearly all workers’ 
compensation payments have been 
completed within five years while the 
losses continue, presumably far beyond. 
But the real surprise is the continuing 
nature of earnings losses after five years. 
Conclusion
Although it is clear that compensable 
workers’ compensation injuries involve 
significant permanent wage loss for 
many workers, it is not clear why. 
Is this more like a displaced worker 
phenomenon? Research from the Workers 
Compensation Research Institute (2006) 
highlights the fact that a significant 
minority of injured workers do not 
achieve a “substantial” return to work, 
ranging from 10 percent in Wisconsin 
and Pennsylvania to 25 percent in Texas. 
We need a better understanding of this 
research before reaching a definitive 
judgment of the adequacy of workers’ 
compensation earnings replacement 
benefits. 
H. Allan Hunt is assistant executive 
director, Kelly DeRango is a research fellow, 
and Eva Madly is a research associate, all at 
the Upjohn Institute.
References
National Academy of Social 
Insurance. 2004. Adequacy of Earnings 
Replacement in Workers’ Compensation 
Programs. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research.
Workers Compensation Research 
Institute. 2006. “Comparing Outcomes 
for Injured Workers in Seven Large 
States.” Publication WC-06-01. 
Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation 
Research Institute.
Mini-grant-Funded Research
The Economics of Voluntary 
Disclosure in SAT Scores
Gabrielle Chapman, Michael Conlin,
and Stacy Dickert-Conlin
Syracuse University
 An increasing number of colleges 
have made reporting SAT I (the two-
part standardized verbal and math test) 
scores voluntary. These schools argue 
that the test score differentials in the SAT 
are not a result of aptitude differences 
but rather biases in the test that favors 
particular groups. The game theoretic 
models of voluntary disclosure suggests 
that if revealing SAT scores is voluntary 
and slightly costly, only those students 
with the low SAT scores will withhold 
their scores (i.e., the “unraveling” 
equilibrium). All others will reveal their 
scores to avoid the assumption that 
they have extremely low scores. Using 
proprietary admissions data from a 
college with such a policy, we find that 
this trend generally holds for students 
with very high SAT scores—even 
conditional on observables, these students 
submit their SAT scores. Yet, applicants 
with relatively low SAT scores are less 
likely to withhold their scores than 
students with midrange SAT scores. 
In addition to testing the theory of 
voluntary disclosure, two other trends in 
education policy and practice motivate 
this research. The first is the paradox 
represented by this trend toward making 
standardized test scores optional in 
college admissions paired with the 
increased reliance on standardized 
testing in other education arenas, such 
the estimated $500 million per year test 
preparation industry and President Bush’s 
education reform agenda. That agenda 
includes the No Child Left Behind Act 
of 2001, which requires states to develop 
a grade by grade standardized testing 
system as a measure of accountability. 
The second motivating policy issue 
for our research is the ongoing policy 
challenge in higher education that seeks 
to equalize college access, particularly 
among those students historically most 
underrepresented. The differential effect 
on college access of making SAT scores 
optional in the admission process has 
not been thoroughly evaluated. After 
conditioning on observables, we find 
evidence that female applicants are still 
more likely to not submit their SAT 
scores, but we find very little evidence 
that the same is true for minorities.
The Educational Progress of 
Immigrant Children:
California in Perspective
Deborah Garvey
Santa Clara University
Twenty percent of children under age 
18 in the United States had at least one 
immigrant parent in 2000. In California, 
by contrast, the share was more than 
double at nearly 50 percent. Since 
